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and	just	over	a	year	after	the	discharge,	the	debtor	filed	a	motion	
to reopen the case to avoid the liens on the exempt property. The 
debtors’ bankruptcy attorney submitted the explanation for the 
failure	to	file	the	motion	during	the	bankruptcy	case	as	resulting	
from the attorney’s error in believing that the debtors would not 
continue	farming.	The	attorney	blamed	a	full	schedule	of	filings	
by clients whom the attorney did not know well. The court held 
that the motion would be granted because the debtors relied on 
the advice of the attorney and the creditors were not prejudiced 
by the delay in that the creditors had not made any attempts to 
repossess the equipment or enforce their liens. In re Vaske, 339 
B.R. 489 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa).
CHAPTER 12
 SECURED CLAIMS. The debtor had granted a mortgage 
to a creditor on the debtor’s farm on which the debtor operated 
a breeder poultry operation. The debtor obtained chicks from a 
poultry integrator which had refused to supply the debtor with more 
chicks, resulting in the debtor’s default on the mortgage. The issue 
in the case was the value of the farm property. The debtor argued 
that the farm should be valued according to the debtor’s intended 
future use of the farm as a residence and crop farm. Under this 
view, the debtor’s appraiser did not assign any value to the poultry 
buildings because the debtor would be unable to use the buildings. 
The appraiser noted that the buildings would not only not provide 
value but could have a negative effect on the farm’s value. The 
creditor argued that the farm should be valued according to its 
highest and best use as a broiler poultry operation, because if the 
farm was sold, the poultry integrator would be willing to supply 
chicks	to	a	different	owner	and	purchase	the	finished	birds.	The	
creditor’s appraiser included the value of the poultry buildings in 
the farm value. Both parties agreed to the basic value of the farm 
but differed in their inclusion of the poultry buildings.  The court 
noted that the debtor was prevented from converting the farm to 
a broiler poultry operation because the poultry integrator refused 
to do business with the debtor; thus, the debtor’s proposed use of 
the farm was not speculative or capricious and could be used to set 
the value of the property. The court also noted that the creditor’s 
appraisal was unclear as to whether the value included the costs 
of conversion. The court held that the value of the farm would 
be the debtor’s value based on the intended use of the farm as a 
residence and for growing crops.  In re Bishop, 339 B.R. 595 
(Bankr. D. S.C. 2005).
FEDERAL TAX
 AUTOMATIC STAY.	The	debtors	filed	a	Chapter	13	petition	
on December 27, 2004 and included a claim for taxes by the IRS. 
The amount of the tax claim was disputed but was split into an 
unsecured priority claim and an unsecured general claim. The 
IRS sought permission to offset a pre-petition 2003 tax refund 
against the IRS claim. The 2003 tax refund would be offset against 
ANIMALS
 BOBCATS. The plaintiff had purchased a residence in a 
residential subdivision which was subject to a restrictive covenant 
which prohibited residents from keeping “cattle, swine, poultry, 
fowl, wild animals, or exotic animals” in a residence. The 
subdivision governing association discovered that the plaintiff 
kept a bobcat at the plaintiff’s residence and ordered a removal 
of the animal. The plaintiff refused and the association sought a 
court order. The plaintiff argued that the jury instruction on the 
definition	of	a	wild	animal	should	have	included	an	instruction	
that a wild animal did not include animals which had been 
sufficiently	 domesticated	 or	 trained.	The	 court	 approved	 the	
trial court’s refusal of the plaintiff’s proffered instruction and 
use	of	 the	Restatement	(Second)	of	Torts,	§	506	definition	of	
wild animal as “an animal that is not by custom to the service 
of mankind at the time and in the place in which it is kept.” The 
trial court jury determined that the bobcat was a wild animal 
prohibited by the restrictive covenant and the appellate court 
upheld the verdict as supported by the evidence.  Lineberry v. 
Riley Farms Property Owner Ass’n, 2006 Ark. App. LEXIS 
393 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006).
 WILDLIFE. The defendant was charged with violation of the 
Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(2)(A) for receiving whitetail 
deer sold or transported in violation of Oklahoma law. The 
defendant argued that the deer were not wildlife because the deer 
were “farm raised domestic deer,” born and raised in captivity. 
The court noted that the statute included all wildlife, “whether or 
not bred, hatched, or born in captivity. . .,” which are normally 
found in a wild state; therefore, the court held that whitetail deer 
born and raised in captivity are governed by the statute and the 
defendant’s conviction was proper.  United States v. Condict, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43826 (E.D. Okla. 2006).  
BANkRUPTCY
GENERAL
 AVOIDANCE OF LIENS. The debtors, husband and wife, 
were	 farmers	who	filed	 for	Chapter	 7,	 although	 the	 debtors	
intended to continue farming. The debtors listed several pieces 
of	farm	equipment	as	exempt	and	filed	a	motion	to	avoid	liens	on	
the exempt property. The motion was denied without prejudice 
and	the	debtors	failed	to	file	another	motion	before	the	case	was	
closed with a discharge. After the discharge, the creditors did 
not attempt to repossess or foreclose on the farm equipment, 
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dischargeable pre-petition taxes owed and the debtors argued that 
the	offset	should	be	against	non-dischargeable	tax	first.	The	court	
noted that, if the offset against dischargeable taxes was allowed, the 
debtors	would	not	be	able	to	make	the	plan	payments	due	to	fixed	
income and substantial medical bills.  The court acknowledged 
the rule of several cases that a debtor can direct a payment to the 
IRS only if the payment is voluntary. The debtors argued that the 
Bankruptcy Court had the authority to allocate a non-voluntary tax 
refund. The court held that, because the IRS was allowed by statute, 
I.R.C. § 6402(a), to allocate a tax refund, the court did not have the 
authority	to	order	the	IRS	to	allocate	the	refund	to	a	specific	claim	
in bankruptcy.  In re Lybrand, 338 B.R. 402 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 
2006).
 CLAIMS.	The	debtor	filed	for	Chapter	7	and	notified	the	IRS	
of	 the	 bankruptcy	 filing.	 	Although	 the	 IRS	was	 aware	 of	 the	
bankruptcy	filing,	the	IRS	failed	to	file	any	claims	for	over	nine	
years,	although	the	claims	were	filed	before	the	Bankruptcy	Court	
approved	 the	 trustee’s	 final	 report.	The	 IRS	filed	 an	 unsecured	
priority claim and a general unsecured claim. The court held that, 
although	the	priority	claim	was	untimely	filed,	Section	726(a)(1)	
required that the priority claim be paid as an allowed claim. The 
IRS general unsecured claim was also still allowed but was to be 
paid	after	timely-filed	unsecured	claims.		In re Profco, Inc., 339 
B.R. 614 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS
 CROP  INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed regulations 
which amend the Common Crop Insurance Regulations, Basic 
Provisions, Small Grains Crop Insurance Provisions, Cotton Crop 
Insurance Provisions, Coarse Grains Crop Insurance Provisions, 
Malting Barley Crop Insurance Provisions, Rice Crop Insurance 
Provisions, and Canola and Rapeseed Crop Insurance Provisions 
to provide revenue protection and yield protection. The proposed 
regulations also amend the Common Crop Insurance Regulations, 
Basic Provisions to replace the Crop Revenue Coverage, Income 
Protection, Indexed Income Protection, and the Revenue Assurance 
plans of insurance. The proposed changes offer producers a choice 
of revenue protection (protection against loss of revenue caused 
by low prices, low yields or a combination of both) or yield 
protection (protection for production losses only) within one basic 
provision and the applicable crop provisions to reduce the amount 
of information producers must read to determine the best risk 
management tool for their operation and to improve the prevented 
planting and other provisions to better meet the needs of insured 
producers. The changes will apply for the 2009 and succeeding crop 
years.  71 Fed. Reg. 40193 (July 14, 2006).
 HUNTING. The plaintiffs owned farm land which was used to 
raise crops and for a hunting club. In order to attract geese during 
their annual migration, the plaintiffs would gradually harvest the 
corn so the residue would attract the geese. The delayed harvest 
would continue well past the normal harvest periods for the area. 
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The Fish and Wildlife Service determined that the delayed harvest 
violated FWS hunting regulations which allowed hunting only on 
“normally harvested” farm land. The plaintiffs also used airplanes 
to aerially seed the corn residue with wheat seed, also to attract 
the geese. The FWS also determined that this aerial seeding was 
not “normal planting” and hunting on the land was prohibited. 
The plaintiffs’ neighbor informed the plaintiffs that the neighbor’s 
land was baited as part of the neighbor’s own hunting business. 
The FWS determined that the plaintiffs’ land could not be hunted 
because it was affected by the baiting of the neighbor’s land. The 
plaintiffs challenged the FWS determinations as arbitrary and 
capricious. The court upheld the FWS determination that the 
plaintiffs’ land was not normally harvested because the harvesting 
continued long after 90 percent of the corn was harvested in the 
area. The court also upheld the FWS determination that aerial 
seeding of the corn residue with wheat seed was not normal 
planting because expert testimony showed that such planting 
was rarely used because of the very limited results in producing 
a marketable crop. The court upheld the FWS determination 
that hunting on the plaintiffs’ land was prohibited because of 
the baiting of a neighbor’s land, noting that the scope of the 
prohibition as to the area affected was within the reasonable 
judgment of the FWS.  Falk v. United States, 2006 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16768 (8th Cir. 2006).
 NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM. The AMS has issued 
proposed regulations which would amend the USDA National 
List	of	Allowed	and	Prohibited	Substances	regulations	to	reflect	
recommendations submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture by the 
National Organic Standards Board (NOSB) on August 17, 2005, 
adding two substances, along with any restrictive annotations, to 
the list of prohibited substances.  71 Fed. Reg. 37854 (July 3, 
2006).  
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT  TAXATION
 REFUND. The decedent died on February 16, 1998 and the 
estate	obtained	an	automatic	extension	of	time	to	file	the	estate	tax	
return to May 16, 1999 after paying estimated estate taxes. The 
estimated tax payment was in excess of the actual amount owed 
but	the	estate	did	not	file	its	estate	tax	return	until	July	30,	2002,	
more than three and a half years after the initial return was due. 
The IRS denied the  claim for refund under I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A) 
because	the	return	was	filed	more	than	three	years	after	the	return	
was due. The estate executor had made several informal contacts 
with IRS agents during the three years requesting additional time 
to	file	the	estate	tax	return.	All	of	the	agents	stated	that	the	estate	
would not suffer any penalties because the estate had paid more 
tax than was due. The estate argued that these contacts with 
the IRS agents should be considered “informal claims” which 
tolled the three year limitation period for refunds. The court 
noted that the “informal claim doctrine” rule had been used to 
excuse harmless taxpayer mistakes or was based on a waiver by 
the IRS of the formal requirements, based on the circumstances 
of each case.  The court held that the estate had demonstrated 
sufficient	evidence	for	a	jury	to	find	that	an	informal	claim	had	
been	made	to	the	IRS	from	the	IRS	agent	contacts	sufficient	
to apply the “informal claims doctrine” to allow the refund. 
The IRS motion for summary judgment on the refund claim 
was denied. Stevens v. United States, 2006-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 60,528 (N.D. Calif. 2006).
 RETURN. The IRS has announced that requests for estate 
tax lien discharges for decedents who were residents of Iowa 
should be submitted to the following address:
Internal Revenue Service
Attn: Estate and Gift Tax Group
210 Walnut Street
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
 Requests for estate tax lien discharges for decedents who 
were residents of Nebraska should be submitted to the following 
address:
Internal Revenue Service
Attn: Patricia Henderson
1313 Farnam Street, STOP 4431-OMA
Omaha, Nebraska 68102-1881
 TAX LIEN. The IRS had made an assessment of taxes 
owed	and	filed	a	Notice	of	Tax	Lien	against	the	decedent.	The	
decedent then transferred a residence to a third party and the 
decedent as joint tenants. Before the IRS sought foreclosure 
on the tax lien, the decedent died and the property passed to 
the joint tenant.  Although the IRS settled with the joint tenant 
on the tax lien issue, the IRS also sought enforcement of the 
tax lien against the decedent’s estate. The court held that the 
death of the decedent removed any interest of the decedent’s 
estate in the property subject to the tax lien; therefore, no 
enforcement action could be taken against the estate.  United 
States v. Vittaly, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46136 (N.D. Calif. 
2006).
 TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the following 
case.  The decedent had owned several commercial properties 
when placed under a guardianship. The guardian and the 
decedent’s heirs agreed to an estate plan for the decedent and 
the commercial properties were transferred to family limited 
partnerships with various heirs as partners and the decedent as 
general and limited partner. The estate plan provided for gifts of 
the decedent’s partnership interests up to the annual exclusion 
amount. The court found that the parties had an agreement that 
all of the income from the partnerships would be available to 
the decedent during life; therefore, the decedent retained a 
right to the income from the partnerships and the partnerships 
were included in the decedent’s estate under I.R.C. § 2036, 
except to the extent the decedent received money from the 
partnerships in exchange for the property transferred to the 
partnerships. Estate of Abraham v. Comm’r, 126 S. Ct. 2351 
(2006), denying cert., 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,502 
(1st Cir. 2005), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2004-39.
 VALUATION.  The decedents, husband and wife, each 
died owning a partial share of a trust which held timberland.  The 
estates valued the decedents’ interests with a 50 percent discount 
for	 the	 partial	 interest.	 	The	 IRS	 assessed	 a	 deficiency	 based	
on a valuation of the interests without the discount but with a 
valuation which was reduced only by the costs of partitioning the 
decedents’ interests.  The estates provided substantial evidence of 
the impediments to partitioning and evidence that the local custom 
was to give a 50 percent discount to the value of partial interests. 
The Tax Court, Estate of Baird v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-258, 
held that the estate was entitled to a 60 percent discount for the 
partial interests. The Tax Court denied the estate’s litigation and 
administrative costs against the IRS, holding that the IRS position 
was	substantially	justified.	The	appellate	court	reversed,	holding	
that the estates had presented timely substantial evidence to support 
the	discounts,	making	the	IRS	position	unjustified.	On	remand,	the	
estates were allowed attorney fees at the statutory rate. See Harl, 
“Co-Ownership Discounts: Fifth Circuit Says IRS Position Not 
‘Substantially	justified,’”	16	Agric. L. Dig. 137 (2005).  Estate of 
Baird v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-140, on rem. from, 2005-2 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,505 (5th Cir. 2005), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 
2002-299.
 FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
 BAD DEBTS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, were a self-
employed plumber and a legal secretary, respectively. The husband 
had obtained a contract with a city for plumbing services but 
apparently was not paid under those contracts. The taxpayers 
claimed business expenses associated with the plumbing business 
and business bad debt deductions based on the failure of the city 
to pay the taxpayer under the contract. The amount of the bad debt 
deduction	claimed	was	just	sufficient	to	reduce	the	income	tax	to	
zero each year. The court held that the unpaid contract payments 
could not be claimed as a business bad debt deduction because none 
of the payments was ever included in income. The other business 
expense deductions were disallowed for lack of any substantiation. 
Schnell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-147.
 CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT. The taxpayer was a member 
of an agricultural marketing cooperative and, under the Uniform 
Marketing Agreement, the cooperative was designated as the 
taxpayer’s agent.  In 1994 and 1995 the taxpayer received a notice 
of discretionary “value-added” payments from the cooperative 
to be made to the taxpayer in November of each year. However, 
the notices allowed the taxpayer to elect to defer receipt of the 
payments to the following January, which the taxpayer did. The 
court held that, under Bot v. Comm’r, 353 F.3d 595 (8th Cir. 2003), 
aff’g, 118 T.C. 138 (2002), the cooperative acted as the agent 
of the taxpayer and that the only limitation on the receipt of the 
money in November was self-imposed by the taxpayer; therefore, 
the taxpayer constructively received the money in November and 
could not defer recognition of the income to the following tax year. 
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See also Warren v. United States, 613 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1980). 
See Harl, “No Deferral Where Payment Received by Agent 
(Payments Constructively Received),” 15 Agric. L. Dig. 105 
(2004).  Scherbart v. Comm’r, 2006-2 U.S Tax Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 50,386 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2004-143.
 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS. The IRS has issued guidance on 
the use of debit cards, credit cards and stored-value cards to 
reimburse employees in self-insured medical reimbursement 
plans and dependent care assistance programs. The guidance 
provides that substantiation of reimbursed medical expenses and 
co-payments needs to be made by an independent third party. 
Notice 2006-69, I.R.B. 2006-29.
 The IRS has announced that rebates or cash incentives offered 
by employers, who do not manufacture the cars, to employees in 
order to encourage the purchase of hybrid cars constitute taxable 
compensation. Employers must include the cash incentive 
amounts on the employees’ year-end Form W-2. The amounts are 
also subject to income tax withholding and employment tax. An 
exclusion for employee discounts may apply to manufacturers 
of the cars, but the employer must produce the property and 
other requirements must be met. IR-2006-112.
 HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was an attorney and CPA 
who inherited the family farm. The taxpayer moved to the farm 
and made several improvements with the plan to make the 
farm productive so that it could be passed on to the taxpayer’s 
children. The farming activities included the harvesting and 
planting	of	trees	and	crop	share	leasing	of	hay	fields.	The	farm	
did	not	produce	any	profit	 in	 two	tax	years	and	the	 taxpayer	
claimed loss deductions for those two years, with one year not 
having any income from the farm. However, in four other tax 
years, the farm had income in excess of expenses.  Initially, the 
court determined that the three main farm activities could be 
treated as one operation for purposes of determining whether the 
farm	was	operated	with	an	intent	to	make	a	profit.		The	taxpayer	
argued that the taxpayer was entitled to the presumption of a 
profit	intent	of	I.R.C.	§	183(d)	because	the	farm	was	profitable	
for	three	out	of	five	years.	The	court	held	that	the	presumption	
did	not	apply	because	 the	 farm	did	not	have	 three	profitable	
years before the tax years in which the losses were claimed 
as deductions. The court held that the farm was not operated 
with	the	intent	to	make	a	profit	because	(1)	the	taxpayer	did	not	
maintain complete and accurate records of the farm operation; 
(2) the taxpayer did not create a written business plan to make 
the	farm	profitable;	(3)	the	taxpayer	did	not	make	any	changes	
to the farm operation to reduce the losses or increase income; 
(4) although the taxpayer grew up on the farm, the taxpayer 
did	not	consult	any	experts	on	making	the	farm	profitable;	(5)	
although the taxpayer spent a considerable amount of time 
working on the farm, the taxpayer did not demonstrate how this 
work	increased	the	farm’s	profitability	and	the	taxpayer	received	
substantial	recreational	benefit	from	the	work;	and	(6)	although	
the	farm	had	a	modest	profit	in	one	year,	the	losses	in	the	two	
other years were substantial and offset substantial income from 
the taxpayer’s main employment. The court allowed imposition 
of the accuracy-related penalty of I.R.C. § 6662(a) because the 
taxpayer was a tax attorney and accountant who was familiar 
with the rules for hobby farm loss limitations.  Mitchell v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-145.
 HYBRID VEHICLE TAX CREDIT.  Effective for vehicles 
placed in service after December 31, 2005, an alternative motor 
vehicle	credit	is	allowed	which	is	the	sum	of	(1)	qualified	fuel	
cell motor vehicle credit, (2) advanced lean burn technology 
motor	vehicle	credit,	(3)	qualified	hybrid	motor	vehicle	credit,	
and	 (4)	qualified	alternative	 fuel	motor	vehicle	credit.	 I.R.C.	
§ 30B(a). The credits allowed cannot exceed the regular tax 
reduced by other credits over the tentative minimum tax for the 
year. I.R.C. § 30B(g)(2). The credits are treated as a general 
business credit if the vehicle is subject to an allowance for 
depreciation. I.R.C. § 30B(g)(1). The IRS has announced the 
hybrid	vehicle	certifications	and	the	credit	amounts	for	several	
vehicles:
 Year and Model Credit Amount
 2007 Saturn Vue Green Line $650
 2006 GMC Sierra 4WD hybrid pickup truck $650
 2007 GMC Sierra 4WD hybrid pickup truck $650
 2006 Chevrolet Silverado 4WD hybrid pickup truck $650
 2007 Chevrolet Silverado 4WD hybrid pickup truck $650
 2006 GMC Sierra 2WD hybrid pickup truck $250
 2007 GMC Sierra 2WD hybrid pickup truck $250
 2006 Chevrolet Silverado 2WD hybrid pickup truck $250
 2007 Chevrolet Silverado 2WD hybrid pickup truck $250
 In addition, the following vehicles powered by natural gas 
qualify for the credit in the following amounts:
 2005 Honda Civic GX $4,000
 2006 Honda Civic GX $4,000
See Harl, “Additional Items in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
16 Agric. L. Dig. 131 (2005). IR-2006-108, IR-2006-109, IR-
2006-110.
 INCOME. The taxpayer was an accrual basis corporation 
which provided warehousing and distribution services for 
several grocery corporations. The taxpayer entered into several 
contracts with suppliers under which the taxpayer agreed to make 
a certain amount of purchases and the suppliers provided an 
up-front payment. The taxpayer also agreed to provide a certain 
amount of shelf space in each store for the goods purchased and 
to provide substantial marketing and advertising promotions of 
the products. Under the agreement, the up-front payments were 
to be repaid on a prorated basis if the taxpayer failed to purchase 
the agreed amount or the suppliers felt that the marketing was 
not	sufficient.	The	Tax	Court	held	that	the	advance	payments	
had to be claimed as income in the tax year received and not in 
the year the payments became nonrefundable. The Tax Court 
noted that the taxpayer had complete use of the funds when 
received and provided immediate consideration for the payments 
in the form of guaranteed shelf space and marketing efforts. The 
appellate court reversed, holding that the advance payments were 
subject to an obligation to repay the amounts if the taxpayer did 
not meet all the terms of the marketing agreement. Westpac 
Pacific Foods v. Comm’r, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15160 (9th 
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 REPORTING.	The	 IRS	has	 adopted	 as	 final	 regulations	
relating to the changes made by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 
in reporting of payments of $600 or more of gross proceeds 
to attorneys. The regulations affect attorneys who receive 
payments of gross proceeds on behalf of their clients and certain 
payors (for example, defendants in lawsuits and their insurance 
companies and agents) that, in the course of their trades or 
businesses, make payments to these attorneys. 71 Fed. Reg. 
39548 (July 13, 2006).
 RETURNS.  The	IRS	has	announced,	due	to	the	recent	flooding	
of	the	IRS	headquarters,	temporary	special	procedures	for	filing	
certain expedited letter request rulings for reorganizations and 
I.R.C. § 355 distributions.  Taxpayers (or their representatives) 
should contact the office of the Associate Chief Counsel 
(Corporate) at (202) 283-7930 and ask to speak to an attorney 
regarding these temporary procedures. In addition, the 
temporary address for hand-delivered (or courier delivered) 
ruling requests is: IRS, 950 L’Enfant Plaza, Fifth Floor, 
Washington, D.C., 20024. IR-2006-105. See also IR-2006-107 
for	more	information	about	the	flooding	of	the	IRS	Washington	
D.C. headquarters.
 TAX SCAMS. The IRS has established an e-mail mailbox 
(phishing@irs.gov) for taxpayers to notify the IRS of suspicious 
e-mail	purportedly	from	the	IRS.	The	IRS	has	identified	at	least	
99 different scams including e-mails claiming that taxpayers 
have	a	refund	due	and	directing	the	 taxpayers	 to	an	official-
looking but fake web site. IR-2006-104.
 WAGES. The taxpayer employer made payments to an 
employee in exchange for termination of their employment. The 
payments were made while the employees were furloughed from 
their jobs. The taxpayer argued that the payments were excluded 
from	wages	as	supplemental	unemployment	benefits	because	
the employees were already not working when the payments 
were made and the payments represented the transition of 
unemployment from undetermined duration to permanent 
unemployment. The court held that, because the decision to 
permanently terminate employment was made by the employee, 
the payments were wages subject to FICA withholding taxes. 
CSX Corp. v. United States, 2006-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
50,377 (Fed. Cl. 2006).
PROBATE
 WITNESSES. The decedent had executed a typed will and 
presented it to a notary for notarization. Calif. Probate Code 
§	6110(c)	 requires	 two	witnesses	 for	 qualification	 of	 a	will	
for probate; therefore, the probate court refused the will and 
instituted alternative administration. After the will was refused 
for probate , the decedent’s representative discovered that the 
notary’s spouse had witnessed the notarization of the will and the 
spouse signed the will as a witness. The court held that Section 
6110(c) required the witness signatures to be made before the 
death of the decedent; therefore, the will still did not qualify for 
probate. The dissent argued that the statute contained no time 
requirement for the witness signatures but only required that the 
witnesses be present at the same time when the decedent signs 
the will or acknowledges the signature. The majority opinion 
acknowledges that the statute does not expressly state when the 
witness signatures must be made, but the majority held that the 
lack of such a time requirement rendered the statute ambiguous 
and in need of interpretation through the legislative history. 
Estate of Saueressig v. Goff, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 7507 (Calif. 
2006).
PROPERTY
 AGREED EASEMENT. The parties in this case were all 
members of the same family and either purchased or received 
their separate farm properties from the same parent. The 
defendant owned farmland situated between the properties 
owned by the plaintiffs. An irrigation system was established 
by the defendant and the parent on all three properties, with 
pipes running through the defendant’s parcel onto one of the 
plaintiff’s land. The defendant removed a cap on the system 
which resulted in the loss of water to the plaintiff’s land and 
the plaintiffs sued to have an agreed easement declared for the 
irrigation pipes through the defendant’s land and to prevent the 
defendant from interrupting the system.  The defendant argued 
that an oral easement could not be proved. The court held that 
the trial court award of the agreed easement was supported by 
the defendant’s participation in constructing the system, the 
initial common ownership of the properties involved and the 
plaintiffs’ use of the irrigation system.  Holden v. Cloud, 2006 
Ark. App. LEXIS 447 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006).
STATE REGULATION OF 
AGRICULTURE
 RECOMMISSIONS. The  plaintiff grew pomegranates and 
contracted with a commission merchant for the marketing of the 
crop over two years. The plaintiff alleged that the commission 
merchant re-consigned the produce to the defendants and falsely 
reported the amount of sales. The plaintiff sued the commission 
merchant and the other sellers for breach of contract, conversion, 
breach	of	fiduciary	duty	and	breach	of	the	covenant	of	good	
faith and fair dealing. The seller defendants moved to dismiss 
the action because they were not a party to the contract with the 
commission merchant but were merely buyers of the produce. 
The trial court agreed with the defendants but the appellate court 
reversed,	holding	that	the	plaintiff	had	alleged	sufficient	facts	
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for	a	trier	of	fact	to	find	that	the	sellers	were	consignees	or	agents	
of	 the	plaintiff	 and	owed	 the	plaintiff	 a	fiduciary	duty	 to	 report	
accurately all sales and commissions. Mendoza v. Rast Produce 
Co., Inc., 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 991 (Calif. Ct. App. 2006).
STATE TAXATION
 AGRICULTURAL USE. Plaintiff purchased just over seven 
acres of rural property zoned as residential which allowed 
agricultural activities as a conditional use. The plaintiff used the 
property initially as a residence but acquired a few horses to start 
a	horse	breeding	operation.	The	operation	was	not	very	profitable	
and the plaintiff was not able to prove that the operation had more 
than	$2,500	 in	 annual	 income.	The	 county	notified	 the	 plaintiff	
that a horse breeding operation was not permitted on land zoned as 
residential without a conditional use permit.  The plaintiff argued 
that the plaintiff was not subject to the zoning restriction because, 
under the New Jersey Right-to-Farm Act, N.J. Stat. §§ 4:1C-1 to 
-10.4, commercial agricultural operations were exempt from local 
zoning restrictions. The State Agricultural Development Committee 
(SADC) ruled that the plaintiff’s horse breeding operation was 
not a commercial agricultural operation because the operation did 
not have at least $2,500 in income from production of agricultural 
products or expected income under a contract for animal production. 
The plaintiff argued that the SADC’s interpretation of the statute 
to exclude stud service and boarding income was unreasonable but 
the court held that the statute was clear in focusing on production 
of agricultural products and not on services.  In re Tavalario, 2006 
N.J. Super. LEXIS 183 (N.J. super. 2006).
 PROPERTY TAX.  The plaintiff owned farm and ranch land 
which was reassessed as part of a county-wide reassessment by 
the county director of equalization. Although the director made 
adjustments for location, soil type, and several other factors, 
the director did not include the existence of appurtenant and 
nontransferable water rights. The plaintiff argued that the failure to 
include this distinction in the valuation of county land resulted in a 
higher value for the plaintiff’s land, which did not have appurtenant 
and nontransferable water rights. The court agreed with the plaintiff, 
noting	that	water	rights	were	a	significant	factor	in	valuing	farm	and	
ranch land. The court noted, however, that the director did not need 
to distinguish between irrigated and non-irrigated land, if the land 
had water rights, because the irrigation decision was a voluntary 
decision of the landowner. Apland v. Butte County, S.D., 2006 
S.D. LEXIS 83 (S.D. 2006).
WORkERS’ COMPENSATION
 AGRICULTURAL LABORER.  The employer operated 
an alligator breeding business which raised alligators to be 
slaughtered for sale of their meat, hides and heads. The majority 
of the business came from the sale of the hides. The employee 
worked as a pen cleaner and was bitten by an alligator while 
cleaning	 out	 a	 pen.	The	 employee	filed	 a	 claim	 for	workers’	
compensation	 benefits	 but	 the	 claim	was	 denied	 because	 the	
administrative law judge ruled that the employer operated a 
farm and the employee was a farm laborer, under Code Ga. § 
34-9-2(a); therefore, neither party was subject to the workers’ 
compensation statute. The court held that alligators were not 
farm animals but were considered wildlife; therefore, the raising 
of alligators was not farming under the workers’ compensation 
statutes. The court also held that, although the employee was 
performing farm labor at the time of the accident, because the 
employer was not operating a farm at the time of the accident, 
the accident was covered by the workers’ compensation statute. 
Gill v. Prehistoric Ponds, Inc., 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 671 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2006).
CITATION UPDATES
 Davis v. Taylor, 132 P.3d 783 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) 
(nuisance) see p. 79 supra.
 In re Torelli, 338 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006) (Chapter 
12 eligibility), see p. 43 supra.
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